# HG changeset patch
# User Roy Marples <roy@marples.name>
# Date 1607811174 0
# Node ID f0957b45f5474b6e16b1de132862d3ac7c5647e6
# Parent  3853222e97c748aee49645d319a37f5fd73450fa
privsep: Fix Linux i386 for SECCOMP as it just uses socketcall

Rather than accept(2), recv(2), etc..... which is horrible!

Thanks to Steve Hirsch <stevehirsch49@msn.com> for testing.

diff -r 3853222e97c7 -r f0957b45f547 src/privsep-linux.c
--- a/src/privsep-linux.c	Sat Dec 12 17:41:37 2020 +0000
+++ b/src/privsep-linux.c	Sat Dec 12 22:12:54 2020 +0000
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
 #include <linux/sockios.h>
 
@@ -311,6 +312,23 @@
 #ifdef __NR_sendto
 	SECCOMP_ALLOW(__NR_sendto),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+	/* i386 needs this and demonstrates why SECCOMP
+	 * is poor compared to OpenBSD pledge(2) and FreeBSD capsicum(4)
+	 * as this is soooo tied to the kernel API which changes per arch
+	 * and likely libc as well. */
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_ACCEPT),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_ACCEPT4),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_LISTEN),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_GETSOCKOPT),	/* overflow */
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_RECV),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_RECVFROM),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_RECVMSG),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SEND),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SENDMSG),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SENDTO),
+	SECCOMP_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
 #ifdef __NR_shutdown
 	SECCOMP_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
 #endif